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CONSTITUTIONAL RULES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT: 
MARBURYv. MADISON AND THE CASE 
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Larry Alexander* 
As we mark the 200th anniversary of Marbury v. Madison, 1 
it should be noted that huge forests have been levelled and tons 
of ink spilled in analyzing, interpreting, and debating the merits 
of John Marshall's opinion in that case, and that the best forecast 
is to buy pulp and ink in the commodities market. The Marbury 
literature shows no signs of abating, and not just because of the 
spate of anniversary conferences and symposia. As other nations 
consider the merits of American-style judicial review- and as we 
ourselves, with every Supreme Court decision striking down leg-
islation that we believe to be constitutionally valid, continually 
reassess its merits and provenance-Marbury scholars will have 
plenty of demand for their wares. 
The Marbury debate, of course, proceeds on different lev-
els. There is a huge and rich literature on the merits and implica-
tions of the Marshall opinion apart from its assertion of judicial 
review. Was Marshall's interpretation of the Original Jurisdic-
tion clause-that Congress could not alter the Court's original 
jurisdiction-correct (and how does it square with, say, Cohens 
v. Virginia2)? Do appointments to federal office really vest after 
the signing and sealing of a commission but before the commis-
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I want 
to thank the participants in the bicentennial celebration of Marbury v. Madison for 
stimulating exchanges, and I want particularly to thank Mike Paulsen, Sai Prakash, and 
Fred Schauer for their comments. Any remaining errors in this article are, it goes without 
saying, their fault. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (upholding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 
over federal question case in which state was a party). And see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91 (1972) (upholding lower court jurisdiction over cases within Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction). 
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sian's delivery? Is a suit seeking a writ of mandamus always an 
invocation of original jurisdiction, and is that true as well of suits 
seeking, say, writs of habeas corpus?3 Did the Judiciary Act of 
1789 really purport to enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction?4 
And so on. 
Moreover, there is a less well-developed but hopefully 
growing literature on other aspects of Marbury. Why did Mar-
bury sue in the Supreme Court instead of in some lower court?5 
And why didn't Marbury himself pursue his federal magistrate's 
position after losing in the Supreme Court, perhaps by attaching 
Marshall's opinion to his petition? Indeed, why did Marbury 
need the commission-the actual piece of paper, that is-after 
having had Marshall declare him to have been legally appointed 
to his office? 
But, of course, the main body of the vast Marbury oeuvre 
concerns judicial review. As everyone in Con Law lOllearns, in 
Marbury John Marshall held that the Supreme Court could de-
clare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional and refuse to en-
force it or otherwise give it effect. That holding has been-and 
will undoubtedly continue to be-debated from two basic van-
tage points. One debate focuses on the constitutional legitimacy 
of judicial invalidation of congressional acts. Is judicial review 
provided for in the Constitution, and if so, where? Or did the 
Court just run it up the flagpole to see if we would all salute? In 
other words, is judicial review pre or meta-constitutionally le-
gitimate- because, like the Constitution itself, we have accepted 
it as such-even if it is not in the Constitution of 1789? 
The other great debates regarding judicial review are over 
its scope and force. Marbury invalidated a congressional act that 
unconstitutionally enlarged the Court's own jurisdiction. So one 
could read it quite narrowly. But, of course, judicial review has 
been extended to every constitutional question raised by the ac-
tivities of any governmental actor, state or federal, with the ex-
ception of that rarefied set of constitutional questions known as 
"political questions," constitutional questions deemed by the 
Court to be committed to some nonjudicial body. (When will we 
know that we have a real "political question"? Only in cases 
where the Court identifies a constitutional limit on some other 
3. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, eta!, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
4. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 
DUKE L.J. 1, 15. 
5. See Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in 
the Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMM. 607 (2001). 
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governmental actor's permissible range of action, announces 
that, in its opinion, that actor has transgressed that constitutional 
limit, but concludes that it is the actor's interpretation of the 
limit rather than the Court's that the Court will and should fol-
low. This shows why some commentators are doubtful about the 
existence of political questions.6) 
Although the debate over the proper scope of Marbury rages 
on, I believe that the better arguments are those that find it as-
sumed by the Framers and probably validly inferred from the 
text.7 Article III's reference to "cases arising under the Constitu-
tion," although susceptible to counter-Marbury interpretations,8 
surely is arguably read to countenance judicial review of all con-
stitutional cases, including those dealing with congressional 
power. And the "state judges" portion of Article VI seems to 
contemplate state judicial determinations of the validity of con-
gressional acts as a predicate to deeming those acts supreme 
over inconsistent state laws.9 Putting these textual passages to-
gether with the strong evidence that the Framers contemplated 
judicial review10 makes the case for judicial review's broad scope 
satisfy for me the "more probable than not" standard of proof. 
The debate over Marbury's force is somewhat more episodic 
than the debate over its scope. The debate over its force is no 
doubt the reason I've been invited here, for it's the only Mar-
bury debate on which I have uttered an opinion in public. 
On the weakest plausible reading of Marbury, the Court's 
decisions on constitutional issues are binding on other officials 
only with respect to the cases in which those decisions are 
reached. Those decisions settle the particular controversies in 
which the constitutional issues arise. They have res judicata ef-
fects, but no stare decisis effects. If similar issues arise in other 
cases, no official, judicial or non-judicial, including the Court it-
self, is bound to give any effect to the Court's previous interpre-
tations of the Constitution. This is essentially the view attributed 
to Lincoln11 and in recent history espoused by Ed Meese. 12 For 
6. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 
597 (1976). 
7. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Original Understanding of Judi-
cial Review 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887. 
8. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 6 (1962). 
9. Article VI states in relevant part that "the Judges in every State shall be bound 
[by the Constitution], anything in the Constitutions or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." See Prakash and Yoo, supra note 7. 
10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
11. See Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, in 3 THE 
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them, the Constitution, not the Court's interpretations of it, is 
what is authoritative for citizens and officials. The Court can 
bind us to its decrees only insofar as is necessary to resolve par-
ticular lawsuits. That is the limit of "judicial power." 
At the other end of the "force" spectrum of glosses on Mar-
bury is the Court's own gloss in Cooper v. Aaron.13 There the 
Court essentially declared that although both officials and citi-
zens may believe that the Court's interpretations are incorrect, 
those interpretations function as supreme law- they function as 
Article VI says the Constitution functions-unless and until the 
Court itself repudiates them. (An even stronger version of Mar-
bury, but one that the Court did not adopt in Cooper, would 
make the Court's constitutional precedents immune from over-
ruling, even by the Court itself.) 
Now the Cooper gloss on the force of Marbury is what gives 
rise to one version of the so-called countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. There are two versions of the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. One version finds troubling the idea that a past generation 
can lay down rules constraining the will of the majority in the 
present and future generations. On that version, constitutional-
ism is the culprit, not Marbury or Cooper. I have written else-
where that I do not find this type of countermajoritarianism at 
all problematic/4 unlike, for example, such anti-constitutionalists 
as Jeremy Waldron.15 Indeed, on my view of law, on which law's 
essential function is to resolve moral controversy and its con-
comitant uncertainty through determinate rules, all law consists 
of the past binding the present.16 
The other version of the countermajoritarian difficulty is as-
sociated with judicial review and with Cooper in particular. It 
views as troubling, not constitutional constraints themselves, but 
the fact that judicial interpretations of those constraints trump 
all other interpretations. 
Now this version of the countermajoritarian difficulty itself 
has two versions. On one-1'11 call it the M.P./G.L. version after 
COLLECfED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); Abra-
ham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 4 THE COLLECfED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 262,268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
12. Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979,983-86 (1987). 
13. 358 u.s. 1 (1958). 
14. See Larry Alexander, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 1-15, 11-13 (1998). 
15. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
16. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001 ). 
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its most famous proponents-the problem with judicial suprem-
acy a la Cooper is that it elevates judicial interpretations of con-
stitutional constraints over the constraints themselvesY On the 
M.P./G.L. version, only the Constitution, not its judicial gloss, is 
the "Supreme Law of the Land." M.P./G.L. and their running 
dogs argue for radical protestantism in constitutional interpreta-
tion. (There can be degrees of this, of course: each governmental 
official might follow his own interpretation, or each governmen-
tal branch might follow its own interpretation, with the Presi-
dent's interpretation binding all other Executive Branch offi-
cials, the Court's interpretation binding the rest of the judiciary, 
and so on. Gary Lawson refers to this as "departmentalism" and 
subscribes to it.18 But the underlying logic of the position-that 
the Constitution, not its interpretation by particular officials, is 
what binds us-leads to the more radical anarchical position.) 
The other version of the Cooper-based countermajoritarian 
difficulty goes like this. Whenever the Constitution is not com-
pletely transparent, so that its interpretation is at issue and is 
controverted, its interpretation should be settled by majoritarian 
institutions. In other words, this version accepts constitutional-
ism-constraint of present majoritarian bodies by past majori-
ties-and, unlike the M.P./G.L. position, it accepts the need for 
settling disputed constitutional matters, even if the settlement is, 
in others' eyes, erroneous as a matter of constitutional interpre-
tation. What it does not accept in Cooper is that it is the Su-
preme Court rather than the popularly elected officials whose 
interpretation should count as having settled the matter.19 (Jer-
emy Waldron at times voices this complaint along with the anti-
constitutionalism one, and at times he conflates the two, though 
they are quite different.20) 
Fred Schauer and I have written a couple of vigorously criti-
cized articles extolling the virtues of constitutional settlement 
and of the courts as constitutional settlers.21 We find more to 
17. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a 
Structural Imperative (or 'Pucker Up and Settle This!')," 20 CONST. COMM. 379 (2003). 
18. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267 (1996). 
19. Perhaps the strongest version of this view is Mark Tushnet's. See, e.g., MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAYFROMTHECOURTS (1999). 
20. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 15, at Chapter Twelve. 
21. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defend-
ing 1 udicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CON ST. COMM. 455 (2000). 
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praise in Cooper than most constitutional scholars, or at least 
most of the constitutional scholars who do not imagine that the 
Supreme Court reads their articles or will adopt their favorite 
theories if transmitted through the law clerk pipeline. 
In the remaining time I would like to examine the virtues 
and drawbacks of Cooper by making some more distinctions. 
(Making lots of distinctions may, alas, be my highest and best 
use.) One relevant distinction is between constitutional issues 
that it is important to settle with some finality and constitutional 
issues that can be left controverted and unresolved without too 
much damage. Actually, this is less a binary distinction than a 
continuum. Most constitutional provisions that organize the fed-
eral government, prescribe the method of making laws, separate 
the powers, and so forth, are provision on which it's important to 
have a high degree of settlement. Some rule, even if not the wis-
est, is better than no rule. On the other hand, constitutional pro-
visions setting forth the powers of the federal government vis-a-
vis the states or prescribing rights present less urgent cases for 
settlement. For them, a bad rule may be worse than no rule. 
So that's one relevant distinction, or rather continuum-the 
relative value of settlement vis-a-vis normative optimality. A 
second relevant distinction is between those constitutional provi-
sions that were intended by the Framers to function as determi-
nate rules and those that were intended by them to be vague, ab-
stract standards. The latter (standards) are essentially 
delegations to future decisionmakers to determine what really is 
just, fair, and reasonable. The former (rules) are preemptive of 
future decisionmakers' own normative judgments. 
Now the Framers may have prescribed a rule in an area 
where settlement is not so important and a standard in an area 
that cries out for settlement. So the two distinctions I have made 
are not really one distinction differently described. If the Fram-
ers did intend a standard, not a rule-they employed concepts 
that are indeterminate because vague or essentially contested2 -
and if there is no urgent need for settlement, the judicial inter-
pretations might well be left unentrenched against other 
branches or officials and against subsequent courts as well. The 
court might, for example, rule in favor of Katz in a wiretapping 
case, in favor of Kyllo in a thermal imaging one;23 but other offi-
22. W.B. Gallic, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167 (1956). 
23. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
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cials might legitimately keep on engaging in those practices if 
they believe them not to be "unreasonable searches," and the 
court could at any time do an about face and concur. 
The third relevant distinction is between those questions 
that a court is more likely to answer correctly and those ques-
tions that a majoritarian body is more likely to answer correctly. 
The more legalistic the question- "What did the Framers mean, 
given that they intended the provision to be a rule, not a stan-
dard, when they worded the provision thus and so?"-the more 
likely it is that a court will be superior to other officials in reach-
ing the right answer. On the other hand, matters are more com-
plicated when it comes to vague standards regarding rights or 
powers. First, assuming the Framers intended a standard, does it 
govern an area where the value of settlement is high? In other 
words, is it a standard that can be left indeterminate, except as 
necessary to resolve individual lawsuits, or does the domain gov-
erned by the standard cry out for "rulification"- translating the 
standard into determinate rules? And second, if the standard is 
to be "rulified," will a majoritarian body or the President outper-
form the courts in getting matters right under such a constitu-
tional standard? Or will the courts instead outperform the popu-
lar institutions? Or would some Canadian-style dialogic relation 
be superior to either judicial supremacy or majoritarian suprem-
acy?2 That is an empirical question about which I surely have no 
special expertise. 
So my conclusions about the Cooper gloss on Marbury are 
these. First, if the Framers put a rule in the Constitution, whether 
or not a rule is desirable, and the rule's interpretation is at issue, 
Cooper makes good sense. The question is a legalistic one, and 
Courts have a comparative advantage in answering legalistic ques-
tions. If the issue is one that requires settlement more than opti-
mality, then Cooper should reign and the Court itself should ad-
here to a strong doctrine of stare decisis. If the issue is not one that 
urgently requires settlement, however, the Court should be open 
to revisiting its prior interpretations; but it should only reverse 
them when it concludes both that they were wrong as a matter of 
interpretation and also that they are at least arguably normatively 
27 (2001). 
24. In Canada, the Parliament can pass a statute deemed by the courts to violate 
the Charter "notwithstanding" such a judicial ruling. See CAN. CONST. pt. I (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) section 33 (providing that Parliament or provincial leg-
iSlatures may expressly declare that their enactments shall operate notwithstanding Char-
ter provisions interpreted to be in conflict with such enactments). 
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inferior to the correct interpretation. (There is no virtue in revers-
ing an incorrect interpretation that everyone concedes is norma-
tively superior to the correct interpretation. Getting the Constitu-
tion right is not as important as settlement, even in areas where 
settlement is not itself so important, when the right interpretation 
is not normatively superior to the previously settled one. That is 
what Fred and I argued in our earlier pieces?5) 
Second, if the Framers enacted a standard, and thus failed 
themselves to settle the matter and instead delegated it, the de-
sirability of Cooper judicial supremacy and strong stare decisis is 
a function of relative institutional competence and relative ur-
gency of settlement. The more urgent the need for settlement, 
the more appealing are judicial supremacy and strong stare de-
cisis. The relative institutional competence question focuses on 
not only epistemic comparisons-which institution is most likely 
to discern the best answers to the normative questions the stan-
dards delegate-but on motivational comparisons as well. A leg-
islature may be institutionally better equipped to answer some 
normative questions but because of various pressures or con-
straints less motivated than courts to answer them correctly. 
Thus, only where the Framers intended a standard, and where 
there is either (1) no need for settlement (rulification) or (2) the 
majoritarian institutions both can settle matters and settle them 
better than courts can, is Cooper inappropriately invoked. 
Finally, a word about liberty and law. There are two princi-
pal threats to liberty. One is tyranny; and it is the tyranny of 
power concentrated in the Supreme Court that makes folks like 
Gary Lawson recoil from the Cooper gloss on Marbury.26 The 
other threat is anarchy. Lawson finds anarchy more attractive 
than most people do, perhaps because his picture of the state of 
nature is more Lockean than Hobbesian. But the Hobbesian in-
25. See Alexander and Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, su-
pra note 21, at 1379-81. 
Consider, in this respect, the rule in the Constitution that the President must be thirty-five 
years of age. U.S. Canst., Art. II,§ I, c\. 5. Suppose that the question is whether that rule refers 
to the President's age at the time of his election or to his age at the time he takes office, and the 
Supreme Court resolves that question one way or the other. Moreover, suppose the Supreme 
Court's resolution of the question is regarded by Congress and the President as erroneous in 
light of the evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. There is sti\1 good reason to 
adhere to the Court's misinterpretation and treat the issue as settled. There is a much greater 
need for some settlement than for the ideal settlement-see Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U.S. 393, 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting: "[S]ometimes it is better that things be settled than 
that they be settled correctly."). And here, neither the Court's settlement nor the correctly inter-
preted Constitution's, if different, are mischievous ones. 
26. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 379-80. 
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dictment of anarchy is not merely that humans are ill-motivated, 
though some surely are. The more serious Hobbesian indictment 
is that in the state of nature, no matter how well-motivated we 
are, we will disagree about our rights and duties vis-a-vis one an-
other, and the results will be morally calamitous. Put differently, 
the problem to which law is a solution is not motivation but 
knowledge.27 If law is to provide that knowledge, it must settle 
that which is controverted; and where the lawgiver attempts to 
do so but fails- because it lays down a norm that is a rule of un-
clear meaning or that is not a rule at all- then some other insti-
tution must provide the settlement. Lawson's antipathy toward 
settlement transcends the Constitution, Marbury, and Cooper. It 
applies to statutes and common law as well, so long as we dis-
agree about their prescriptions. It is, indeed, an anti-law posi-
tion, a general case for anarchy, and no stronger than such a case 
can be. 
Well, that's where I'm going to leave these quite messy mat-
ters-in a mess. The Cooper gloss on Marbury is not some dere-
lict attempt to overthrow the Constitution through judicial coup 
d'etat. For most constitutional questions, Cooper has a lot to rec-
ommend it. Indeed, for some constitutional questions, Cooper 
might usefully be supplemented by a very strong doctrine of stare 
decisis. On the other hand, there may be some constitutional 
questions on which Cooper should be weakened. Perhaps City of 
Boern£!-8 was an inappropriate invocation of the Cooper view, 
though whether it was depends on such matters as whether the 
Free Exercise Clause is a rule or a standard and the relative com-
petence of Congress and the Court in implementing it. I take no 
27. See Larry Alexander, With Me, It's All er Nuthin': Formalism in Law and 
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 549 (1999); ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, supra note 16, 
chapters 1 and 2. 
28. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 on the ground that it was not an enforcement, in pursuance 
of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the right to the free exercise of religion, 
guaranteed under section 1 of that amendment, but rather was a congressional redefini-
tion of that right in opposition to the Supreme Court's definition in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
There is an interpretive question whether the Equal Protection Clause is a standard regard-
ing equal treatment or a rule that merely mimics the provisions of the Reconstruction Civil 
Rights Acts. The Supreme Court has treated the clause as a standard and rulified it in such cases 
as Brown v. Board of Education, with respect to de jure racial school segregation, in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. (2003) with 
respect to racial affirmative action, and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) with respect to 
gender classifications. Arguably, any or all of these decisions may have either misinterpreted the 
clause to be a standard or, if the clause is a standard, rulified it suboptirnally or even mischie-
vously. Many who decry Cooper in other contexts support it with respect to these cases, how-
ever. 
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position here on such matters. What I do claim is that the Coo-
per gloss on Marbury should get at least two cheers and certainly 
no boos. 
